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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Misleading Advertising
(continued from page 115)

a threshold issue, whether to characterize as commercial the speech
in question. Commercial speech is
less central to the first amendment
than other forms of speech and
therefore receives less constitutional protection. According to the
court, there was "no question" that
the advertisements were commercial. In applying the factors used to
determine whether particular
speech is commercial, the court
first noted that the advertisements
were part of an expensive marketing strategy to extol one competing
product over another and were
prompted by economic selfinterest. Second, the court concluded that affording the parties'
speech less constitutional protection would not "chill" freedom of
speech. Given the highly competitive nature of the health care industry, an advertising restriction
would not deter the companies
from appropriately touting the relative merits of their products and
services in the future. Moreover,
both U.S. Healthcare and Blue
Cross-Blue Shield were uniquely
situated to verify the truthfulness
of their own statements. Third, the
information disseminated in the
various advertisements added little to the "marketplace of ideas" so
vital to a market economy.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield argued
that even if the speech at issue was
characterized as commercial, it
should be afforded a heightened
degree of protection because the
subject of the advertisementsquality health care-was at the
center of public debate. The court
disagreed and held that advertisers
should not be immunized from
defamation actions merely by
cloaking their objectionable speech
in terms of public interest. Even
though the advertisements concerned the quality and availability
of health care, their primary aim
was to sell a product. Because the
statements were advertisements
"pure and simple," the court concluded that a heightened evidentiary standard should not apply.
"Public" Versus "Private" Figure Protection. Next, the court con116

sidered the nature and weight of
the state's interest in compensating
the parties for injury to reputation.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield argued that
U.S. Healthcare was a "public figure" and therefore the state had a
limited interest in protecting U.S.
Healthcare's reputation. In determining whether the parties were
"public" or "private" figures, two
factors weighed heavily: the parties' access to the media and the
manner in which the risk of defamation came about. With regard to
the first factor, the companies had
the ability to engage in extensive
advertising and therefore lacked
the vulnerability associated with
private citizens. With regard to the
second factor, because of their aggressive advertising, both companies had thrust themselves into a
situation in which they invited
controversy and reaction. Although both of these facts would
support finding that the parties
were "limited purpose public figures," the court concluded that the
companies were not public figures.
Because the parties were motivated by profit rather than a public
figure's desire to resolve an issue of
public debate, the speech did not
warrant the heightened protection
afforded comment on "public figures." Thus, the first amendment
did not require a greater burden of
proof than that required under the
applicable state and federal laws.
As a final matter, the court held
that the trial judge improperly had
reconstituted the deadlocked jury
after declaring a mistrial. The jurors, on the assumption that they
would not be required to deliberate
further, revealed why they were
deadlocked. The court therefore
vacated the jury's subsequent verdict and reinstated Blue CrossBlue Shield's counterclaim.
Eileen B. Libby

BANK THAT
RESTRICTED ITS
CUSTOMERS' CASH
MACHINE PRIVILEGES
WITHOUT PRIOR
NOTICE DID NOT
VIOLATE THE
ELECTRONIC FUND
TRANSFERS ACT
In Feinman v. Bank of Delaware,
728 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1990),
the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware held
that a bank did not violate the
Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1693a-1693r (1988)
("the Act"), when it temporarily
restricted without notification customers' access to their account
through automatic teller machines.
The court also held that although
the bank did violate the Act by
failing to remove the restriction
after the reasons for imposing it no
longer existed, the customers could
not recover damages because they
failed to prove actual injury.
Background
Jeff and Consuela Feinman
("the Feinmans") maintained a
Big Plus Account ("the account")
at the Bank of Delaware ("the
Bank"), which included a checking
and savings account. The Feinmans could make withdrawals, deposits, and other transactions
through automatic teller machines
("ATMs"), commonly known as
cash machines, subject to certain
terms and conditions of the account. The bank included these
conditions in an initial statement
the Feinmans received when they
opened the account. The Feinmans' account also included overdraft protection, which permitted
the bank to transfer funds from the
Feinmans' savings account to their
checking account to cover overdrafts. The Feinmans overdrew
their checking account eight times
in the fourteen months preceding
the incident in question.
On Friday, February 19, 1988,
the Feinmans cashed four checks
and made two ATM withdrawals
resulting in an overdraft of over
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Tell-Free Consumer Hotlines
Nader's Raiders, the con-

sumer advocacy group founded
by Ralph Nader, has published
a new booklet, the Consumers
Guide to Tol-Free Hotlines.
The 28 page booklet is available
by sending $1.00 (check or

money order) and a business
size, self-addressed, stamped
envelope to:
Hotlines
P.O. Box 19405
Washington D.C., 20036
$100. The next working day, February 22, a bank employee restricted the Feinmans' access to their
account through ATMs by placing
a "deny cash" restriction on their
account. That same day the Feinmans made a deposit that gave the
account a positive balance of almost $400. The bank employee did
not know of the February 22 deposit when she decided to impose
the "deny cash" restriction on the
Feinmans' account.
This "deny cash" restriction
prevented the Feinmans from using ATMs for deposits or to cash
checks directly with the bank's
tellers. Claiming the restriction
was imposed for security reasons,
the bank did not give the Feinmans
prior notice of the "deny cash"
restriction.
On February 27, the Feinmans
and their children drove from their
home in Newark, Delaware, to
Philadelphia for dinner. Jeff Feinman attempted to withdraw cash
from an ATM in Philadelphia but
could not do so because of the
"deny cash" restriction. The Feinmans then drove to the home of
Jeff Feinman's brother to borrow
money and spend the night. The
next day, Jeff Feinman made several unsuccessful attempts to withdraw cash from ATMs. These repeated failures prompted the
brother to tease the Feinmans,
which allegedly embarrassed and
humiliated them.
On February 29, Jeff Feinman
contacted the bank and requested
that the restriction be removed.
The bank counseled Feinman
about the consequences of ATM
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overdrafts and, after confirming a
positive balance in their account,
agreed to remove the restriction. A
bank employee ordered the restriction removed. However, due to a
processing error, the restriction remained in effect. On March 2, Jeff
Feinman again contacted the bank
and requested that the restriction
be removed. The bank removed
the restriction later that day.
The Feinmans sued the bank in
the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware, alleging that the bank violated the Act
by (1) failing to notify them before
placing the restriction on the account; (2) issuing a "deny cash"
restriction when their account actually had a positive balance; and
(3) failing to remove the restriction
on February 29, when Jeff Feinman first requested the removal.
The Feinmans requested statutory,
actual, and punitive damages, as
well as costs and attorney fees.
Prior Notice Was Not Required
Because a Valid Security Risk
Existed
The court first addressed whether the bank's failure to notify the
Feinmans prior to restricting access to their account violated the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act. The
Act provided, in part:
A financial institution shall notify a consumer in writing at
least twenty-one days prior to
the effective date of any change
in any term or condition of the
consumer's account ... if such
change would result in . .
decreased access to the consumer's account. A financial institution may, however, implement a
change in the terms or conditions of an account without prior notice when such change is
immediately necessary to maintain or restore the security of an
electronic fund transfer system
or a consumer's account.
15 U.S.C. § 1693c(b).
The bank, upon opening the
account, warned the Feinmans that
access to their account could be
limited without notice for security
reasons. Although the Feinmans
had overdraft protection on their
account, the court noted that
ATMs could not accurately determine the current balance of ac-

counts covered by the overdraft
protection. Thus, the Feinmans
conceivably could have withdrawn
up to $500 (the daily ATM withdrawal limit) in excess of the account's actual balance. Also, the
Feinmans had a history of overdrafts. Based on these facts, the
court concluded that a security risk
existed that justified the bank's
restriction of the Feinmans' account without prior notice.
Decision to Restrict the Account
Was Properly Based on
Information Available at That Time
The court then analyzed the
Feinmans' claim that the restriction on their account was unjustified because their account had a
positive balance when the bank
implemented the restriction. The
bank employee who decided on
February 22 to restrict the Feinmans' access to their account relied
on a notice of overdraft issued the
previous business day, February
19. However, the court found that
by 3:30 p.m. on February 22, the
Feinmans had deposited funds into their account, giving it a positive
balance of nearly $400. Thus, at
the time the bank actually implemented the "deny access" restriction on February 23, the Feinmans' account was not overdrawn.
The court rejected the Feinmans' claim that the bank should
have checked their account status
between the time of the bank's
decision and the time the bank
implemented the decision. According to the court, this practice would
create an onerous duty on the bank
that needlessly would increase
costs to the consumer. The bank
also would lose the opportunity to
reduce improper use of ATMs in
the future by counseling consumers about ATM overdraft abuses.
The court cautioned that had the
period between the decision and
the implementation been longer
than a single day, the court might
have insisted that the bank check
the account status again before
implementing the restriction. The
court held that the bank did not act
illegally by failing to consider the
deposit that returned the Feinmans' account to a positive balance because that deposit occurred
(continued on page 118)
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after the bank made its decision to
restrict the Feinmans' ATM privileges.
Bank Violated Act by Failing to
Remove Restriction Promptly, But
Customers Failed to Prove Actual
Damages
The court next considered the
Feinmans' claim that the bank
violated their rights under the Act
by failing to remove the restriction
on February 29 when Jeff Feinman
first requested that the restriction
be removed. The Act stated that a
bank would be liable if it failed "to
make an electronic fund transfer..
• in the correct amount or in a
timely manner when properly instructed to do so by the consumer."
15 U.S.C § 1693h(a)(l). The bank
routinely lifted "deny access" restrictions after the account holder
contacted the bank, corrected the
imbalance, and convinced the
bank that no future ATM overdrafts would occur. Jeff Feinman
contacted the bank and made these
assurances on February 29. However, due to a bank error, the
restriction remained in effect until
Jeff Feinman's second request on
March 2.
The court found the bank's failure to remove the restriction on
February 29 amounted to a clear,
but unintentional, violation of the
Act. The court noted that section
1693h(c) of the Act limited recovery for the unintentional violations
to actual damages. The court held
that because the Feinmans had
failed to prove that they suffered
any actual damages during the two
days between their first request
and the day their ATM privileges
were restored, they could not recover.
Mark G. Sheridan
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FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT LIMITS
DEFENSES AVAILABLE
TO BANKS IN
REFUSING TO HONOR
THEIR CASHIER'S
CHECKS
In Warren Finance P. Barnett
Bank of Jacksonville, 552 So. 2d
194 (Fla. 1989), the Florida Supreme Court held that a bank may
assert only its real and personal
defenses in refusing payment upon
presentment of a cashier's check
that it has issued. The bank may
not assert the defenses of a third
party to the check. The court stated
that, in order to preserve the cashlike attributes of cashier's checks, a
bank should not be required to
evaluate the validity of the third
party's defenses and thereby act as
an intermediary between parties
disputing ownership rights to cashier's checks.
Background
Pursuant to a finance agreement, Warren Finance, Inc. ("Warren") advanced funds to Redan
Engineering ("Redan"), in return,
for which Redan assigned to Warren the rights to payments due
Redan under construction contracts Redan held with Blossam
Contractors, Inc. ("Blossam").
Blossam issued checks to Redan,
and Redan tendered the checks to
Warren. Warren then asked to receive cashier's checks instead of
personal checks, to avoid collection problems. Redan and Warren
went to Blossam's depository
bank, Barnett Bank of Jacksonville
("Barnett bank"), and exchanged
Blossam's checks for cashier's
checks that named Redan as the
payee. Redan endorsed the checks
over to Warren, and Warren deposited them in its account in
another bank.
Redan claimed that, in exchange
for assigning the Blossam checks to
Warren, Warren had promised to
forward additional funds to Redan
to cover checks Redan had written
to suppliers. Warren subsequently
refused to advance these additional funds to Redan, and Redan

sought to stop payment on the
cashier's checks. Redan contacted
Blossam, and Blossam, as purchaser of the cashier's checks, telephoned Barnett bank to stop payment on the checks. Barnett bank
refused to honor the cashier's
checks when they were tendered by
Warren.
Warren brought an action
against Barnett bank in the Circuit
Court of Duval County, Florida,
alleging that Barnett bank had
wrongfully dishonored the cashier's checks. Barnett bank defended its refusal to honor the
cashier's checks on the grounds
that (1) Warren was not a holder in
due course, and (2) Warren committed fraud against Redan in the
underlying transaction. The trial
court ruled in favor of Warren.
The First District Court of Appeal
Reversing the trial court, the
First District Court of Appeal stated that if Warren was not a holder
in due course, Barnett bank properly refused to pay the checks
based upon Barnett bank's assertion of fraud. The court remanded
the case for the trial court to
determine whether Warren qualified as a holder in due course. The
First District certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of
whether the issuing bank may assert the defenses of a payee against
the right of a subsequent endorsee
to receive payment on a cashier's
check.
The Florida Supreme Court
Decision
The supreme court initially noted that the purpose of cashier's
checks was to act as a cash substitute. Unlike a personal check,
which requires that the individual
have adequate funds, the bank is
personally liable for paying on its
cashier's checks. Parties desire cashier's checks to avoid the risk of
nonpayment due to insufficient
funds in the account, a stop payment order, or insolvency. The
court then discussed two theories
developed under common law to
identify and analyze these circumstances. They are the "cash equivalent theory" and the "note theory."
Most courts have adopted the
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